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In his Harvard Business Review on "How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy", Michael 
Porter stated that competition in an industry is rooted in its underlying economics, and 
competitive forces exist that go well beyond the established combatants in a particular 
industry. The state of competition in an industry depends on five basic forces, which are: 
1) Threat of New Entrants 
2) Bargaining Power of Suppliers 
3) Threat of Substitute Products 
4) Jockeying for Position among Current Competitors 
5) Bargaining Power of Buyers 
In the soft drink industry, barriers to entry in the form of brand identification, large-scale 
marketing, and access to a bottler network are enormous. Once having assessed the 
forces affecting competition in an industry and their underlying causes, the corporate 
strategist identified the company's strengths and weaknesses. The crucial strengths and 
weaknesses from a strategic standpoint are the company's posture underlying causes of 
each force. The strategists then devised a plan of action that may include (1) positioning 
the company so that its capabilities provide the best defense against the competitive 
force; and/or (2) influencing the balance of the forces through strategic moves, thereby 
improving the company's position; and/or (3) anticipating shifts in the factors underlying 
the forces and responding to them, with the hope of exploiting change by choosing a 
« 
strategy appropriate for the new competitive balance before opponents recognize it. ^ 
On January 25th, 1994，Mr. James A. Lawrence, Pepsi-Cola's President for Asia, Middle 
East and Africa, put his signature to a document which signaled a milestone in Pepsi's 
history. The document was the cooperative Memorandum of Understanding with the 
People's Republic of China, in which Pepsi committed US$350 million to open 10 
I 
new bottling plants in largely impenetrated regions of this massive country. (Exhibit 1) 
The agreement will more than double Pepsi's sales volume in the world's largest 
> 
consumer market of 1.2 billion people over the next five years. The Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed with China's National Council of Light Industry in a historic 
ceremony held at Beijing's famous Great Hall of the People. The choice of China's most 
prestigious venue reflects the importance of January's event to China as well as Pepsi. 
The US$350 million in capital expenditure will center on the transfer of Pepsi's state-of-
the art technology and equipment to the new and existing operations, as well as the 
introduction of modern management and marketing systems. Since entering the China 
market in 1982 as one of the PRC's first US joint venture partners, Pepsi products have 
become leading brands in the imported sector of the consumer market. Currently, Pepsi 
operates 12 joint ventures in China: bottling plants in nine major cities - in Shenzhen, 
Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Beijing, Shanghai, Nanchang, Guilin, Chengdu and Chongqing, 
together with the Pepsi & Asia Beverage Co. Ltd., two concentrate plants and the 
creations of Pepsi Tianfu Beverage Co. Ltd. in Chongqing in January, 1994. The plants 
will produce Pepsi-Cola's flagship range of soft drinks, including Pepsi-Cola, 7Up and 
Mirinda brands - as well as other carbonated and non-carbonated beverages. Now, with 
the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of the People's 
Republic of China, Pepsi is poised to make even greater inroads into the world's most 
rapidly expanding market. Pepsi has an opportunity to make a quantum leap forward, and 
establish i^elfat the forefront ofmtemational investment and expects to command a 25 
percent share within the next few years. Pepsi is also committed to assisting the 
development of China's soft drink industry. Its goal is not only to drive the growth of its 
own product portfolio, but also to expand a range of popular Chinese brands. Globally, 
z 
Pepsi intends to become a full-line refreshment beverage company - a strategy it intends 
to pursue in China. Pepsi's plans are entirely in line with those of the People's Republic 
of China. The spirit of harmony between a US company and the country of China is 
expected to result in a bright and successful future for all. 
As joint-ventures was chosen as the new market strategy to further penetrate a huge 
potential market like China, the management of Pepsi are facing with issues on the 
integrations after takeovers. The difficulties encountered are beyond imagination, 
however, the management has been taking it as another ‘Pepsi Challenge，. Also, on the 
other hand, foreign direct investment has been an important of capital, technology and 
expertise for China's economic development. But, on the other hand, foreign investments 
have also exacerbated regional income disparity and labor-related problems•之 
BACKGROUND OF PEPST-COT.A 
Pepsi-Cola is one of the three equally important divisions ofPepsico Inc. Pepsico 
Inc. is among the most successful fast moving consumer products companies 
in the world. It 's no. 1 in salted snacks, chicken, pizza, and Mexican restaurants. It is no. 
2 in soft drinks. It was founded in 1919, with annual revenue of nearly US$25 billion and 
more than 370,000 employees in 1993^ Headquartered in Purchase, New York, U.S.A., 
some of PepsiCo, Inc's brand names are nearly 100-years old, but the corporation is 
relatively young. PepsiCo, Inc. was founded in 1965 through the merger of Pepsi-Cola 
Company and Frito-Lay Inc. PepsiCo, Inc. divisions operate in three major US domestic 
I 
and international businesses: 
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1. Beverages 
2. Snack Foods 
3. Restaurants 
Through the close cooperation of its divisions, PepsiCo, Inc. has achieved a leadership 
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position in each of these business segments. Its strategy is to concentrate resources on 
growing its businesses, both through internal growth and carefully selected acquisitions 
> 
within these businesses. The corporation's success reflects its continuing commitment to 
growth and a focus on those businesses where it can drive its own growth and create 
opportunities. 
Pepsi-Cola has been playing second fiddle to Coca-Cola for the entire 20th century. 
However, they're a very big fiddle whose sound grew louder and louder during the 1980s. 
Pepsi fired some big guns at Coke during this decade ~ Michael Jackson, Mike Tyson 
and (in a very brief burst) Madonna ~ but in the end Coca-Cola remained number one. 
Coke sells about 40 percent of all soft drinks, Pepsi about 30 percent. But PepsiCo, 
parent company of Pepsi-Cola, is more than soft drinks. In fact, during the 1980s, when 
they nearly tripled their sales, they became a company of three equal parts: soft drinks 
(Pepsi，Mountain Dew), snacks (Frito-Lay) and restaurants (Kentucky Fried Chicken, 
Pizza Hut, Taco Bell). To keep this engine in motion, PepsiCo employs 370,000 people, 
more than 10 times as many as Coca-Cola (restaurants are labor-intensive), operates more 
than 100 manufacturing plants, controls more than 1,000 bottlers and runs more than 
6,000 restaurants. 
HISTORY OF PEPSI-COLA 
In the 1890s, inspired by an Atlanta pharmacist's success with Coca-Cola, imitators 
popped up everywhere, keeping the patent lawyers busy., In New Bern, North Carolina, 
another pharmacist, Caleb D. Bradham, concocted a cola syrup he called pepsi-Cola. He 
dropped the drugstore business entirely by 1902, and a year later registered the Pepsi-
Cola name. By 1909 there were 250 Pepsi bottlers in 24 states. Bradham advertised: 
"Pepsi-Cola is the Original Pure Food Drink - guaranteed under the U.S. Gov't. Serial 
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No. 3818. At all soda fountains, 5 cents a glass ~ at your grocer's, 5 cents a bottle." 
Bradham went broke after World War I，and Pepsi changed hands a lot, finally ended up 
during,the Depression in New York City as an appendage of the Loft candy shop chain. 
Entered Walter Mack, who in the early 1940s made Pepsi the number two soft drink in 
America. Mack headed Pepsi-Cola from 1938 to 1951, and used memorable advertising 
jingles to promote Pepsi. For instance, in pushing Pepsi's 12 ounce bottle (versus Coke's 
classic 6 unce size), the company used lyrics written to an old English hunting song, 
"D'ye Ken John Peel": 
Pepsi-Cola hits the spot 
Twelve full ounes, that's a lot 
Twice as much for a nickel, too 
Pepsi-Cola is the drink for you. 
During the 1950s, Pepsi stopped emphasizing cheap price and began representing 
themselves as the beverage for "those who think young": the Pepsi Generation. In 1957, 
Donald M. Kendall became head of Pepsi-Cola's international division and began a long-
standing relationship with consumers in the Soviet Union (he got Nikita Khrushchev to 
knock back nine bottles of Pepsi during his debate with Richard Nixon at the 1959 
Moscow Trade Fair). Kendall, who later became Pepsi's chief executive, said:，，If we can 





D. Wayne Calloway took over the top post from Donald Kendall in 1986，after a stint 
running Frito-Lay. The two men's personal styles couldn't be more different. Kendall, 
CEO for 21 years, was a forceful, charismatic personality who liked globe-trotting with 
his pal Richard Nixon. Calloway, a soft-spoken southerner with a background in finance, 
5" 
melts into the background more than Kendall ever did. But few doubt Calloway's 
managerial competence. One Harvard Business School professor said, "It was amazing 
how he could get all these terribly ambitious people with big egos pulling in the same 
direction." In 1989，Calloway earned $1.5 million. Pepsi's highly visible number two, 
Roger Enrico, who likes to take potshots at Coca-Cola in the press, wrote a book, Cola 
Wars, published in 1986. Pepsi's board includes General Motors' CEO Roger Smith and 
lawyer Robert Strauss, former head of the Democratic Party. The lone woman on the 
board is Sharon Percy Rockefeller, whose father and husband were both U.S. senators. 
Kendall once introduced her at an official ftinction as “ a very attractive girl." 
PEPSI，S GLOBAL PRESENCE 
In spring 1990，Pepsi signed a $3 billion accord with the Soviet Union to barter their soft 
drink in exchange for the Soviet Stolichnaya vodka of at least 10 Soviet tankers and 
freighters. Pepsi's bottling network in the Soviet Union will double as a result, and Pepsi 
will eventually be available there in cans (rather than just in bottles). The New York 
Times called it the largest deal in history between an American company and the Soviets 
Union. Pepsi has been sold in the Soviet Union since 1974, and the Soviets have paid for 
the drink by bartering Stoli. Because U.S. law keeps restaurant owners out of the liquor 
business and Pepsi is the biggest restaurant owner in the world, Pepsi has sold the 
Stolchinaya to importers abroad. At the same time, Pepsi also has two bottling plants in 
China: one in Beijing and one in Guangzhou. 
PEPSrS PRESENCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 
Pepsi and Coke arrived in the Far East at roughly the same time. Because of its ten to one 
lead over Pepsi in the US in the mid-1940s, Coke could piggyback on its domestic profits 
to invest overseas. Pepsi was more constrained in its investment and partner choices, and 
‘ 
generally had smaller bottlers which were less focused in most markets. Pepsi began 
diversifying in the mid-1960s when it merged with Frito-Lay, and its snack food and 
restaurant operations competed with its soft drink business for corporate allocation of 
> 
investment funds. Pepsi's decision to sell many of its international company owned 
bottling operations in the early 1980s in order to develop its U.S. bottling business left its 
fiirther behind Coke in the international race as the two companies entered the 1990s. 
Coke's advantage in Japan began with its choice of strong bottling partners such as 
Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Kirin. Coke was first to capitalize on the shift from traditional 
trade (family shops serviced by wholesalers) to vending - nearly 45% of Japanese soft 
drink volume in 1993 was sold through vending machines. By 1993, Pepsi had a 3% 
share of the vending market compared to Coke's 35%. Furthermore, Coka (and Japanese 
competitors) beat Pepsi in introducing non-carbonated soft drink products such as ready-
to-drink tea, coffee, and juices as the market diversified and expanded. In 1993, Pepsi 
had 3% of the overall Japanese market compared to Coke's 32%. In the Philippines, a 
combination of Coke's offensive action and Pepsi's errors reversed an historical Pepsi 
advantage. In 1980，Pepsi held 60% of the Philippine soft drink market. Discovery of 
financial irregularities at Pepsi's company owned Philippine bottler led to the sale of the 
operation in 1985 and a decade of decline. Coincidental with Pepsi's dilemma, Coke 
attacked. In 1981，John Hunter then Coke's regional manager for the Philippines, 
declared that in order to reverse Pepsi's two to one market share lead, the company would 
« 
have to invest US$13 million to become the controlling joint venture partner with its 
bottler, which was neglecting the Coke business in favor of the bottler's San Miguel 
brewery. Goizueta approved the investment and soon Coke regained a two to one lead in 
the Philippines. This was the start of Coke's use of the "anchor bottler": a large, 
committed and aggressive bottler with a willingness to expand into new international 
7 
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markets. One bright spot for Pepsi in the Asia-Pacific region was Indochina, where Pepsi 
took cola share leadership in Thailand, maintained market exclusive in Laos and 
Myanmar (Burma), and beat Coke into production in Vietnam after the lifting of U.S. 
embargo. Within seven hours, 40,000 bottles of Pepsi rolled off its modem joint venture 
plant and were shipped to Ho Chi Minh City. The ensuing Pepsi giveaway caused a 
"near riot". International beverages Company, Pepsi's Vietnamese bottlers, anticipated 
the U.S. liberation by stocking concentrate and booking advertising space on TV. Coke, 
on the other hand, experienced an almost three week production delay caused by the 
refitting of its bottler plant. Nonetheless, Coke counterattacked by importing product 
from Thailand to ensure supply of its beverage. With 40 million cases sold in 1994，a 
population of 70 million, and market that is just available to western, Vietnam was 
expected to evolve to a leading Asian soft drink market as its newly liberated economy 
matured. Coke's advertising slogan, "good to see you again", recalled fonder days prior 
to the Communist takeover in 1975 when Coke produced almost 20 million cases per 
annum. Alternatively, Pepsi, with the help of Miss Vietnam, reminded Vietnamese that 
their soda was "the choice of a new generation". The difference between Coke and Pepsi 
in East Asia was consistency. Pepsi's performance, particularly in bottling and 
distribution, was like a pendulum - expanding aggressively, then contracting - whereas 
Coke was consistent and orderly in the e x e c u t e of its strategy. Coke was a master of 
minority ownership and majority control. For example, Coke could have 15% ownership 
in a bottler and still exercise enormous influence. In China, for example, Coke ususally 
chose very well connected conglomerates as bottling partners, such as the Kerry Group 
and Swire Pacific, to develop the market. Conversely, Pepsi often chose local 
manufacturers as bottling partners. 
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NEW MARKET STRATEGY 
Pepsi announced in January 1994 that it received government approval to build 10 new 
bottling plants in China, bringing its total number of bottling plants to 18，and a total 
investment by Pepsi and its local joint venture partners of $600 million by the end of the 
decade. In the contest for Chinese supremacy, Pepsi faced challenges on two levels of 
sophistication: the first concerned the broad landscape of running a soft drink business in 
China, a scenario which Pepsi confronted, and the second concerned company specific 
challenges. In an economy that was essentially state-run, how would Pepsi forge 
relations with the government? As Chinese investment laws compelled to partner with 
local ventures for entry, how would Pepsi select and cultivate domestic alliances in 
bottling, supply, and distribution to implement their country strategy? Pepsi faced 
specific trials in the contest for cola championship in China. The challenge for Pepsi 
were twofold: how could Pepsi regain parity with Coke, and then, how should Pepsi fight 
for leadership? 
SOFT DRTNK INDUSTRY 
Soft drinks consisted of a flavor base, a sweetener, and carbonated water. Three major 
participants in the value chain produced and distributed soft drinks: 




Among these major participants, packaging and sweetener firms are the major suppliers 
to the industry. 
Concentrate Producers The concentrate producer (CP) blended the necessary raw 
material ingredients (exlcuding sugar or high fructose corn syrup), packaged it in plastic 
canisters，and shipped the blended ingredients to the bottler. The CP added artificial 
- ^ 
sweetener aspartame) for making concentrate for diet soft drinks, while bottlers added 
sugar or high frutose com syrup themselves. The process involved little capital 
> 
investment in machinery, overhead or labor. A typical concentrate manufacturing plant 
cost approximately $5 to $10 million to build in 1995, and one plant caould serve a 
country the size of the United States. A CP's most significant costs were for advertising, 
promotion, market research, and bottler relations. Marketing programs were jointly 
implemented and financed by CPs and bottlers. The CP usually took the lead in 
developing the programs, particularly in product planning, market research, and 
advertising. Bottlers asumed a larger role in developing trade and consumer promotions, 
and paid an agreed percentage of promotional and advertising costs. CPs employed 
extensive sales and marketing support staff to work with and help improve the 
performance of their franchised bottlers. They set standards for their bottlers and 
suggested operating procedures. CPs also negotiated directly with the bottlers' major 
suppliers - particularly sweetener and packaging suppliers - to encourage reliable supply, 
faster delivery, and lower prices. Pepsi-Co’s soft drink sales are basically concentrate 
sales from Cps to bottlers. The prices of concentrate are adjusted annually, thus causing 
the bottlers to increase their prices to ultimate consumers. 
Bottlers Before in China, bottlers purchased concentrate, added carbonated water 
and high fructose corn syrup, bottled or canned the soft drink, and delivered it to 
customer accounts. Pepsi practiced a hybrid system of "Direct Store Door" and 
wholesale distribution - wherever feasible, DSD was the distribution of choice. The 
bottling process was capital-intensive and involved specialized, high-speed lines. Lines 
were interchangeable only for packages of similar size and construction. Soft drink 
products were sold in at least six packages of different sizes and/or constructions. 
/ � 
Bottling and canning lines in the U.S. cost from $4-$ 10 million for one line, depending 
on volume and package type. The minimum cost to build a small bottling plant, with 
warehouse and office space, was $20-30 million. The cost of an efficient large plant, 
with approximately five lines and a 15 million case volume, was $30-50 million. 
Roughly 80-85 plants were required for full national distribution within the U.S. 
Packaging accounted for approximately 48% of bottlers' cost of goods sold, concentrate 
for 35%, and nutritive sweeteners for 12%. Labor accounted for most of the remaining 
variable costs. Bottlers also invested capital in trucks and distribution networks. 
Bottlers' gross profits often exceeded 40%, but operating margins were razor thin. 
Pepsi's franchise agreements allowed bottlers to handle the non-cola brands of other Cps. 
Franchise agreements also allowed bottlers to choose whether or not to market new 
beverages introduced by the CP. Some restrictions applied, however, as bottlers were not 
allowed to carry directly competitive brands. Bottlers had the freedom to participate in or 
reject new package introductions, local advertising campaigns and promotions, and test 
marketing. The bottler had the final say in decisions concerning pricing; new packaging, 
selling, advertising and promotions in its territory. Bottlers, however, could only use 
packages authorized by the franchiser. The same conditions regarding competitive 
bottling and packaging applied in China. 
Distributors Because PepsiCo was an asset-intensive company - the concentrate 
business of Pepsi was the exception - the company believed it had strong 
competencies in managing the capital intensive bottling business. The most efficient 
Pepsi plant size produced a 10-15 million case volume. Suppliers Cps and bottlers 
purchased two major inputs: packaging, which in the US included $3.4 billion in cans 
(29% of total can consumption), $1.3 billion in plastic bottles, and $0.6 billion in glass; 
and sweeteners, which included $1.1 billion in sugar and high fructose com syrup, and 
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$1.0 billion in aspartame. In 1993, the majortiy of soft drinks were packaged in metal 
cans (55%), then plastic bottles(PET)(40%), and glass(5%). Cps’ strategy towards can 
manufacturers was typical of their supplier relationships. Pepsi negotiated on behalf of 
their bottling networks, and were among the metal can industry's largest customers. 
Since the can constituted about 40% of the total cost of a packaged beverage, bottlers and 
Cps often maintained relationships with more than one supplier. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
Pepsi backward integrated to make some of their own cans, but largely exited the 
business by 1990. Historically, Pepsi sold its concentrate unsweetened. With the advent 
of diet soft drinks, Pepsi negotiated with artificial sweetener companies, most notably the 
Nutrasweet Company, and sold its diet concentrate to bottlers already sweetened. A 
second source of aspartame was the Holland Sweetener Company based in the 
Netherlands. Nutrasweet's U.S. patent for aspartame expired in December, 1992, which 
subsequently led to a fall in the price of Nutrasweet. 
CHALLENGES TO THE SOFT DRINK INDUSTRY 
When compared with its rival, Pepsi was much slower off the mark to internationalize. 
Moreover, during the mid-1970s, Pepsi sold off many of its international bottling 
investments in order to concentrate on the domestic market. By the late 1980s, Pepsi 
reevaluated its overseas effort and implemented a niche strategy which targeted 
geographic strongholds where per capita consumptions were relatively established and 
the markets presented high volume and profit opportunities. These were often "Coke 
fortresses", and Pepsi put its guerilla tactics to work. One example of such an assault was 
in Monterrey, Mexico, where 90% of the market belonged to Coke's local bottler. In 
1992，Pepsi tripled its market share to 24% in four months using a well-trained team, 250 
new trucks, and a greenfield state-of-the-art bottling plant to supply the arms and 
a 
/2. e— _ 
ammunition for this Cola turf battle. Another Coke fortress was Japan, where a "Pepsi 
Challenge" was launched before a judge issued an injunction against Pepsi to stop using 
its competitor's name in its advertising. Coke responded to these attacks by waging price 
> 
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wars to build volume. "Embrace risk. Act quickly. Innovate constantly. Deliver what's 
perceived as the best value", proved to be the mantra of Christopher Sinclair, Chief 
Executive of PepsiCo Foods and Beverages International. Armed with a five year $2 
billion war chest to upgrade Pepsi's international operations in 1989, and schooled in the 
arts of "competitive jujitsu" where unconventional marketing precepts were used to 
unbalance one's rival, Sinclair was set to commence the global competition. In its 
operations abroad, Pepsi established local bottling partners either through joint ventures, 
equity investments or direct control. However, Pepsi faced the chore of finding suitabe 
bottling partners for market entry. Pepsi restructured or refranchised about half of its 
international bottling network since 1990. In 1992，pepsi earned 15-20% of its profits 
outside of the U.S. compared to 80% for Coke. More strikingly, pepsi，s international 
profit margins represented 6.6% of revenues compared to Coke's 30% return on foreign 
sales. Some of the more exciting international areas included Eastern Europe, China and 
India where Coke and Pepsi's business had been limited, or prohibited, in the past. In 
1994，Pepsi's global market share was only 18% when compared with Coke's 48%.^ 
THE CHINESE BEVERAGE INDUSTRY 
Size and Characteristics In 1993, there were 2,800 soft drink bottling plants in 
China, in an industry which employed about 200,000 people. China's per capita 
consumption of soft drinks was only 13 eight ounce servings a year, compared with 
nearly 800 in the U.S. China was the second largest market in Asia behind Japan and 
industry analysts predicted it would be the largest market outside the U.S. within 15 
years. Coke and Pepsi together had about 22% of the Chinese market of 650 million 
/3 r 
cases produced in 1993. (Exhibit 2) The best selling local beverage in China was 
Jianlibo, a honey-based carbonated soft drink. In 1992, 35 million cases were produced 
> 
in China, which was 6% of the market. There were about 3,000 local soft drink brands, 
of which orange drinks were the most popular. The returnable bottle, the dominant 
package used by Chinese soft drink producers for their local brands, was distributed up to 
a 150 kilometer range. Plastic bottles were shipped to the interior of China, although 
they often lost their carbonation by the time they reached the shelf. Moreover, 
mountainous and hilly terrain, combined with the lack of developed roads in China often 
made transport both within and between various provinces difficult. The use of cans as a 
soft drink package was growing despite the fact that local can suppliers were small, and 
supplies were tight. Selling and delivery accounted for approximately 18% of net sales 
for the typical bottler in China. Wages were one reason for lower Chinese selling and 
delivery cost. Despite these constraints of the Chinese market, bottlers in China were 
extremely profitable, earning on average 20-30% on equity with operating margins 
around 15% - almost 60% greater than their U.S. counterparts. 
Joint Ventures The higher the technological input, the higher will be the need for 
capital to flind product research and development and manufacture. The greater use of 
automation, combined with the general need to exploit economies of scale, will call for 
more capital backing for soft drink industry. As the capital requirements for production 
increase, the smaller manufacturers will be squeezed further out of the market. With 
fewer players in the market, the greater will be the need for a global and pan-national 
marketplace to maintain a competitive edge. The result is increased co-operation 
between the world's largest manufacturers. This allows the spreading of capital costs and 
the sharing of technologies. Companies which compete with each other in the sale of one 
,斗 
form of soft drink are co-operating together in others. Similarly, while two companies 
compete in one region of the world they may set up a joint venture to attack another. Co-
operation will, therefore, be a key feature of globalisation and pan-regional trading. In an 
> 
effort to expand globally out of their core regions, many companies are forming strategic 
alliances with companies in new regions. Pepsi's fist joint ventures in China were 
cooperative joint ventures, where Pepsi provided the assets, the Chinese partner owned 
the land and buildings, and the assets were transferred to the Chinese over time. Pepsi 
made money on concentrate sales, with the Chinese partner making money on bottling 
and sales of the products. There was little profit sharing from the bottler to Pepsi. Coke, 
on the other hand, did not transfer the assets over time to the joint venture partner and did 
share in the bottling profits. 
Government Regulation Historically, the government regulated joint venture 
agreements with the aim of protecting the large domestic soft drink industry. There were 
restrictions imposed on building new plants, on the size of the plant and the number of 
tons of concentrate that each plant could produce, bottle, and sell. The foreign cola 
congestion created by these restrictions was finally broken by Coke in 1992. Coke was 
persistent with the Chinese government in requesting approval for the construction of 
new plants. In late 1992，the Chinese government granted Coke the rights to build 10 
new plants. Pepsi received authorization to build 10 new plants in January 1994. The 
vigor of competition from local substitutes oscillated along with the roller coaster 
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opinions of the government towards foreign businesses. Petty jealousies between 
municipal governments further complicated matters. In general, concessions made to one 
city would become the baseline for opening bargaining sessions should the enterprise 
wish to penetrate another city. The vicious cycle of "deal sweeteners" epitomized the 
complexity of negotiations with the Chinese government. Such ploys though painted the 
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larger canvas of a Chinese cultural wall separating the East from West. Viewed from a 
Western perspective，these cultural traits were obstacles to be scaled; and no cultural 
obstacle presented a more admired tangle than gitanxi. For an attempts to obtain guawci, 
foreign ventures were often asked to balance relation building and adherence to Western 
ethical practices along a razor's edge. 
HISTORY OF PEPSI IN CHINA 
Since entering China in 1982，pepsi injected $50 million into building plants, hiring 
employees, marketing and selling its products. Pepsi planned to spend an additional $350 
million by 1998 to develop its China business. Pepsi expected China to be its second-
largest market outside the U.S. by early 21st century. Moreover, Pepsi did not expect to 
lo 
earn profits from china until the year 2000 in its battle with Coke. In China, the Pepsi 
flavors offered included Pepsi-Cola, Diet-Pepsi in Shenzhen, Mirinda in orange, 
strawberry, and grape varieties, 7Up, Mountain Dew in Shanghai and Beijing, and three 
local brands-Asia, Tianfii, and Bei Bing Yang. 
Bottlers/Partners Pepsi operated a wholly owned concentrate plant in Guangzhou, 
and in 1994, bottled soft drinks at eight joint venture plants, with production of about 65 
million cases annually of brands including Pepsi, 7Up, Mirinda, and local Chinese brands 
Asia and TianfU. In addition, Pepsi's partner in Beijing Bei Bing Yang, produced 4 
million cases a year (under the Bei Bing Yang trademark) which was a 14% local market 
share, and 0.7% national share. The ten new bottling plants which Pepsi planned to build 
were joint ventures with local government agencies, and would enable Pepsi to double 
sales in China. 
Pricing and Advertising Brand awareness surveys were indicative of the penetrance 
of soft drinks into the Chinese lifestyle. In a poll of residents of Beijing, Shanghai, and 
一 ‘(o 
Guangzhou, 34% of those surveyed recognized Pepsi vis a vis 36% for Coke in the cola 
category. On the other hand, 30% recognized Coke's Sprite compared to 5% who were 
familiar with 7Up. The results were close for orange flavored soda as 3% were cognizant 
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of Miranda against 2% for Coke's Fanta. 
Investment Pepsi, like Coke, used countertrade to obtain foreign exchange, and to 
provide leverage and enhance relance relationships with local governments. For instance, 
Pepsi used local profits in RMB to buy Chinese products for use outside China such as 
promotional premiums and mushrooms for Pizza Hut. Pepsi planned to use countertrade 
as there remained aconcern over the long run availability of hard currency. Pepsi also 
gave away products such as coolers, but was more cautious in its approach to the market. 
Pepsi based investment decisions on careful cash flow forecasts and NPV calculations. 
CHALLENGES FOR PEPSI 
Strategy for head to head battle In the huge Chinese market, Coke and Pepsi did not 
have to take share from each other to grow. The issue for Pepsi in the long run, however, 
was not if the company should challenge Coke head on, but when it should challenge 
Coke head on. Coke and Pepsi were competing directly in selected areas. In one of 
Pepsi's cities where Coke did not have a bottling plant, Coke outsold Pepsi. Pepsi's 
small bottlers could not offset the cost penalty faced by Coke when Coke shipped in 
product from outside the city. In the future, Pepsi planned to consolidate its bottler 
system into geopgraphic hubs and drive regional distribution and marketing programs 
« from these centers into neighboring areas where Pepsi had no manufacturing capabilities. 
I 
Regional hubs included the bottlers of the province of Guangdong and Sichuan and the 
bottlers of the cities of Shanghai, Beijing, Nanchang, and Guilin. Local brands would 
have to compete with Coke and Pepsi in 1996, when the capacity licenses required by the 
government were predicted to expire. What was still undetermined was whether the 
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Chinese market would remain a stable duopoly supported by government policy or 
whether Coke and Pepsi would compete head on in most local markets. Pepsi's goal in 
the Chinese market was to win parity with Coke and eventually leadership. The Chinese 
market was still wide open, with the first battles mainly over distribution. The most 
pressing challenges for Pepsi in the long run is how to regain parity and to establish 
leadership. But for the time being, they are facing a bigger challenge which is the 
conversions of these joint-ventures and how to make it run fast enough to be the leader of 
the soft drink industry in China. 
WHY EQUITY JOINT VENTURES? 
Most of the cooperative joint ventures (CJV's) were established in mid 80，s. Due to the 
stringent government regulations at that time, it was not possible for Pepsi-Cola to set up 
equity joint ventures (EJV's). Pepsi-Cola invested about 50% of the initial investment 
which included the production equipment but was not entitled to any profit sharing 
interests. The Chinese party contributed the land where the factory is currently lacated, 
the factory building, some equipment and other tools of trade. Title to all assets of CJV's 
will be passed to the Chinese state government at the end of the contractual terms which is 
usually ten years. And, Pepsi-Cola ‘s return of investment in these CJV's is entirely from 
concentrate sales and their ability to influence management has been minimal. 
I 
Converting into equity joint venture is a key building block in the realization of Pepsi-
Cola's strategic vision for China. It also allows Pepsi to take control of a strategically 
important market before Coca-Cola mobilizes is resourced. The proposal of equity joint 
venture also allows Pepsi-Cola to take a larger share of the value generated by the 
business, previously not possible under the CJV arrangement. Finally, these EJV projects 
ir 
provide attractive financial returns to PepsiCo's shareholders. 
STRATEGIC RATIONALE 
t 
Under-exploited Market Potential in the Franchise Despite 10 years of presence, 
these CJV bottlers have not focused on developing their own selling and distribution 
capabilities to cover all major urban centers in the franchise. Taking the CJV in 
Guangzhou for an example, the Guangdong province they were franchised represents the 
largest volume potential for PCI in China. Over 40% of foreign investments in China are 
channelled into Guangdong and its GDP per capita (calculated under the Purchasing 
Power Parity method) is estimated to be around US$3,250.(Exhibit 3) The total 
population of the province is over 65 million. With an estimated 1994 Carbonated Soft 
Drink (CSD) per capita of 35 8 oz. servings (which is higher than Shanghai's 33 and 
China,s average of 14)，the CSD market of Guangdong today is as high as 96 million 8 oz 
cases. The total population in this franchise territory alone，which includes Guangzhou 
city and surrounding areas’ is 39 million and the estimated CSD market size is 64 million 8 
oz. cases (67% of Guangdong's total volume). Despite a 1994 forecasted volume of 18 
million 8oz. cases, PCI's market share in the Guangzhou franchise is only 16%. In 
particular, the sales of Returnable Bottles (RB) only accounts for 38% of the total volume 
while RB sales mix in the territory is 50%. (Exhibit 4 and 5) 
Window of Opportunity to Widen Gap with Coca-Cola Due to the lack of advertising 
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and marketing support by the CJV's, Pepsi-Cola is perceived as an inferior brand to Coca-
Cola in the market place and Pepsi-Cola products are priced 10% lower than that of Coca-
Cola. Although Pepsi-Cola has higher total volume than Coca-Cola in these franchises, 
Coca-Cola has better penetration and stronger brand equity than Pepsi-Cola, especially in 
the Guangdong province. To date Coca-Cola is estimated to have placed more postmix 
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machines in the market place than Pepsi-Cola. In the meantime, Coca-Cola is stepping up 
its activities in their franchises on two fronts: 
1) Installing new production lines in RB and PET. 
2) Acquiring stakes in other beverage industries such as breweries through the Kerry 
Group and Swire Pacific which will leverage the distribution and marketing 
network. 
However, since taking over these acquisitions, Coke's bottlers have had operational 
problems and its volume in the franchises have decreased. Pepsi-Cola takes the advantage 
of this opportunity to revitalize its image and build a solid leadership over Coke. 
Profit Opportunity Limited by the existing production capacity and infrastructure, the 
CJV's realize that they do not have the resources to grow the business and match Coke's 
efforts. Now that the Chinese Government allows Pepsi to enter into equity joint ventures, 
they understand that Pepsi will not renew or extend its contracts when they expire at the 
end of the 10 years term. Therefore, Pepsi is able to negotiate for a controlling 60% share 
in the new EJV. The conversion presents an excellent opportunity for Pepsi to fully 
exploit the vast market potential which is currently not leveraged by the franchised 
bottlers. And, most importantly, Pepsi will participate in the profits sharing of the EJV 
businesses. 
BUSINESS PLAN 
The business strategy is focused on revitalizing Pepsi-Cola's image, establishing leadership 
and building strong infrastructure to support the business in China which is expected to 
grow at an average of 19% in the next five years. Pepsi-Cola will develop a strong selling 
and distribution system and quickly strengthen presence in high growth markets through 
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China. Key business initiatives will be implemented by a 3-phrased approach to build 
leadership in the joint ventures: 
1) ’ OFFENSIVE THRUST 
A) In order to drive the Pepsi image, management divided China into four hubs: 
Central - Shanghai, Jinan and Nanjing 
North - Beijing, Nanchang and Changchun 
South - Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Guilin and Fuzhou 
West - Tianfu and Chengdu 
B) Develop direct and hybrid selling and distribution systems to expand distribution 
coverage throughout each region. 
C) Relaunch RB in the franchise area not yet converted into EJV's. 
D) Postmix blitz to strengthen presence and lock in major outlets such as Cafe de 
Coral and Fairwood. 
2) BUILD CRTTICAL MASS 
A) Dual RB packaging strategy 
B) Expand distribution with satellite warehousing 
C) Consolidate geographical media efforts. For an example, media spill over from 
Hong Kong will promote Pepsi's premium brand status. 
3) SUSTAIN LEADERSHIP 
A) Continue monitoring performance through PepsiCo’s effective "Key Performance 
I 
Indexes" « 
B) Launch non-carbonated soft drinks to achieve full beverage vision. 
CHINA VISION 2000 - STRATEGIC PRTORTTTFS 
1) Negotiate and execute Memorandum of Understanding with Chinese Central 
Government. 
. 
2) Pre-empt Coca-Cola in Sichuan province through Chengdu start-up and Tianfli 
partnership. 
3) Align pepsi portfolio to consumer preferences. 
4) Elevate presence of Pepsi brands. 
5) Build effective relationships with bottlers and Government. 
6) Develop and execute human resources blueprint for China vision attainment. 
EQUITY JOINT VENTURE STRUCTURE 
Pepsi-Cola and the existing CJV will form a new equity joint venture. Pepsi-Cola will 
contribute 60% of the initial equity interest in the business. Contributions from both 
parties will be either in cash or fixed assets at their fair market values. The key terms of 
the agreement are: 
1) The Board of Directors will consist of seven directors, of which Pepsi-Cola will 
have four and the Chinese partners will have a total of three. The Chinese partners 
will appoint the Chairman of the Board of Directors. Unanimous board approval 
will be required on the following matters: 
a) amendment or modification of the agreement or the articles of association; 
b) termination of the agreement or dissolution of the EJV other than for 
reasons specified in the agreement which will trigger automatic termination; 
c) merger of the EJV with any other companies; and 
d) increase in registered capital. , 
Deadlocks will be resolved through arbitration by the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission. 
2) Pepsi-Cola will appoint the General Manager and the Chinese partners will appoint 
the Duputy General Manager. Their salaries will be flilly home by the EJV. 
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3) All parties will formally acknowledge in the EJV agreement that there will be 
further significant operating capital required to cope with the business growth of 
,the EJV in the future. All additional operating capital requirements of the business 
will be funded by each partner through loan or equity financing at their respective 
equity injection ratio. If any party cannot come up with the required additional 
capital, the other party may arrange to provide loan financing at pre-determined 
terms agreeable to the lender or invest the total amount of required additional 
capital i.e. dilution. The loan will have all the normal attributes of loan financing, 
including a fixed repayment schedule and interest which can be repaid by the 
borrowing party's dividend flows. However, the loan repayment will not be 
contingent on future earning and dividend flows. In case of dilution and increase in 
registered capital is required, that other party shall not unreasonably refuse to 
increase in registered capital. 
4) The duration of the agreemnt is 50 years, the maximum permitted by existing 
Chinese law. The partners may agree to extend the EJV beyond 50 years in the 
future. If an agreement cannot be reached, all parties may bid to purchase the 
assets of the EJV. 
FTNANCTAL IMPACT 
The basic assumption underlying the economic model is that Pepsi-Cola management will 
quickly build up strong selling and distribution capabilities to leverage on the under-
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exploited market potential of the existing franchise and launch aggressive advertising and « 
marketing promotions to enhance Pepsi's market image. Key economic drivers in this 
model are higher than industry growth during initial years on the back of improved 
distribution within the franchise. With successful execution the joint venture will be 
profitable from project year 1. Sustained positive cashflows commence in project year 3 
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after heavy capital expenditure in early years. Since Pepsi's Chinese partners have a 
successful track record with their food and beverage businesses and they will be in a 
position to access the necessary capital to cover their share of the additional equity 
financing to be required. 
Pepsi-Cola's returns are derived from concentrate sales and its 60% equity interest in the 
EJV. Pepsi will unilaterally invest in the first year of joint venture operation to provide a 
core group of managers to transfer operating skills and build the foundations for future 
growth. Under the cooperative joint venture marketing agreement, Pepsi and the bottlers 
share the annual marketing expense of the EJV in the ratio of 30% and 70% respectively. 
Based on this premise the project meets Pepsi's minimum internal rate of return 
requirement of 16%, and generates an incremental shareholder value. 
CONCLUSION 
Consequences of conversion For some CJV converted into EJV, the Pepsi's 
management are facing the dilema of convergence process. We must recognize the 
stubbornness of national differences. Even within existing nations, regional differences 
became more rather than less accentuated. It slowly became clear that national and even 
regional cultures do matter for management. The national and regional differences are not 
disappearing; they are here to stay. In fact, these differences may become one of the most 
crucial problems for management - in particular for the management of multinational, 
multicultural organizations, whether public or private. . 
The fundamental issue involved is how Pepsi's management deals with the fact that people 
are unequal. People are unequal in physical and intellectual capacities. They must realize 
some societies let these unequalities grow over time into inequalities in power and wealth. 
Other societies try to play down inequalities in power and wealth as much as possible. 
»v 
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In their execution of conversion process, they must always remember that the 
convergence of management will never come. What we can bring about is an 
understanding of how the culture in which we grew up and which is dear to us affects 
out thinking differently from other peoples' thinking, and what this means for the 
transfer of management practices and theories. What this can also lead to is a better 
ability to manage intercultural negotiations and multicultural organizations which are 
essential for the common survival of us all. Under these circumstances, Geert 
Hofstede's researches on "The Cultural Relativity of Organization Practices and 
Theories，，are to be guidelines to be advised to Pepsi's management in these 
conversion processes: 
1. Management and National Cultures 
Management in the 20th century no longer applies the "convergence 
hypothesis", and has to recognize the stubbornness of national 
differences. It slowly becomes clear that national and even regional cultures 
do matter for today's management. In fact, these differences may become one 
of the most crucial problems for management - in particular for the 
management of multinational, multicultural organizations, whether public or 
private. 
2. The Importance of Nationality 
Nationality is important to management for at least 3 reasons: 
» 
The first, very obviously, is political. Nations are political units, rooted in 
history, with their own institutions: forms of government, legal systems, 
educational systems, labor and employer's association systems. 
The second reason why nationality is important is sociological. Nationality or 
regionality has a symbolic value to citizens. We all derive part of our identity 
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from it; it is part of the "who am I". The symbolic value of the fact of 
belonging to a nation or region has been and still is sufficient reason for people 
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to go to war, when they feel their common identity to be threatened. National 
and regional differences are felt by people to be a reality. 
The third reason why nationality is important is psychological. Our thinking is 
partly conditioned by national culture factors. This is an effect of early life 
experiences in the family and later educational experiences in schools and 
organizations, which are not the same across national borders. 
3. Mental Programming 
Hofstede's favorite definition of "culture" is precisely that its essence is 
collective mental programming: it is that part of our conditioning that we 
share with other members of our nation, region, or group but not with 
members of other nations, regions, or groups. For an example, language 
is part of an invisible set of mental programs which belongs to the countries' 
national cultures. Such cultural programs are difficult to change, unless one 
detaches the individual from his or her culture. Within a nation or a part of it, 
culture changes only slowly. This is the more so because what is in the minds 
of the people has also become crystallized in the institutions mentioned earlier: 
government, legal systems, educational systems, industrial relations systems, 
family structures, religious organizations, sports olubs, settlement patterns, 
literature, architecture, and even scientific theories. All these reflect traditions 
and common ways of thinking, which are rooted in the common culture but 
may be different for other cultures. One well-known mechanism by which 
culturally determined ways of thinking perpetuate themselves is the self-
fulfilling prophecy. 
4. National Character or National Cultures 
，National Characters are more clearly distinguishable to foreigners than to the 
nationals themselves. In describing national characters we refer to common 
elements within each nation, but we should not generalize to every 
individual within that nation. 
5. Four Dimensions of National Culture 
Individualism versus Collectivism; 
Large or Small Power Distance; 
Strong or Weak Uncertainty Avoidance; and 
Masculinity versus Femininity. 
6. Individualism vs Collectivism 
The fundamental issue involved is the relation between an individual and his or 
her fellow individuals. At one end of the scale we find societies in which the 
ties between individuals are very loose. Everybody is supposed to look after 
his or her own self-interest and may be the interest of his or her immediate 
family. This is made possible by a large amount of freedom that such a society 
leaves individuals. Individualist society is loosely integrated. 
At the other end of the scale we find societies in which the ties between 
individuals are very tight. People are born into collectivities or ingroups which 
I 
may be their extended family (including grandparents, uncles, aunts, and so on), 
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their tribe, or their village. Everybody is supposed to look after the interest of 
his or her ingroup and to have no other opinions and beliefs than the opinions 
and beliefs in their ingroup. Collectivist society is tightly integrated. 
7. Power Distance 
There is a global relationship between Power Distance and Collectivism: 
Collectivist countries always show large Power Distances, but 
> 
individualist countries do not always show small Power Distances. The 
Latin European countries - France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain, plus marginally 
South Africa show a combination of large Power Distances plus Individualism. 
8. Uncertainty Avoidance 
Some societies socialize their members into accepting this uncertainty and not 
becoming upset by it. People in such societies will tend to accept each day as it 
comes. They will take risks rather easily. They will not work as hard. They 
will be relatively tolerant of behavior and opinions different from their 
own because they do not feel threatened by them. Such societies can be 
called "weak Uncertainty Avoidance，，societies; they are societies in which 
people have a natural tendency to feel relatively secure. 
Other societies socialize their people into trying to beat the future. Because 
the future remains essentially unpredictable, in those societies there will be a 
higher level of anxiety in people，which becomes manifest in greater 
nervousness, emotionality, and aggressiveness. Such societies, called "strong 
Uncertainty Avoidance，，societies, also have institutions that try to create 
security and avoid risk. 
There are three ways to create security and avoid risks: one is technology; 
second is law; and third is religion. 
Thus, the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension implies a number of things, 
from aggressiveness to a need for absolute truth, that we do not usually 
consider as belonging together. They appear to belong together in the 
I 
logic of culture patterns, but this logic differs from our own daily logic. 
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9. Masculinity vs Femininity 
Human societies, through the ages and around the globe, have associated 
other roles to men only, or to women only. This is called social, rather 
than biological, sex role division. 
All social role divisions are more or less arbitrary, and what is seen as a 
typical task for men or for women can vary from one society to the other. 
We can classify societies on whether they try to minimize or to maximize the 
social sex role division. Some societies allow both men and women to 
take many different roles. Others make a sharp division between what 
men should do and what women should do. 
10. Some Consequences for Management Theory and Practice 
The naive assumption that management is the same or is becoming the 
same around the world is not tenable in view of these demonstrated 
differences in national cultures. Consider a few of the ideas about 
management which have been popularized in the Western literature in the past 




The most relevant dimensions for leadership are Individualism and Power 
Distance. Individual subordinates are allowed to participate in the 
leader's decisions, but these remain the leader's decisions; it is the leader 
who keeps the initiative. 
12. Organization 
In organization the decisive dimensions of culture are Power Distance and 
> 
Uncertainty Avoidance. Organizations are devices to distribute power, and 
they also serve to avoid uncertainty, to make things predictable. 
13. Motivation 
The theories of motivation are what make people act and the practices of 
motivating people can both be related to the Individualism-Collectivism 
dimension. Individualists seek "self-actualization" of "self-respect" and 
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